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Abstract: 
We study price pressures in stock prices—price deviations from fundamental value due to a 
risk-averse intermediary supplying liquidity to asynchronously arriving investors. 
Empirically, twelve years of daily New York Stock Exchange intermediary data reveal 
economically large price pressures. A $100,000 inventory shock causes an average price 
pressure of 0.28% with a half-life of 0.92 days. Price pressure causes average transitory 
volatility in daily stock returns of 0.49%. Price pressure effects are substantially larger with 
longer durations in smaller stocks. Theoretically, in a simple dynamic inventory model the 
‘representative’ intermediary uses price pressure to control risk through inventory mean 
reversion. She trades off the revenue loss due to price pressure against the price risk 
associated with remaining in a nonzero inventory state. The model’s closed-form solution 
identifies the intermediary’s relative risk aversion and the distribution of investors’ private 
values for trading from the observed time series patterns. These allow us to estimate the social 
costs—deviations from constrained Pareto efficiency—due to price pressure which average 
0.35 basis points of the value traded. 
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Keywords: Liquidity, Inventory Risk, Intermediary, Volatility The ability and cost to trade large quantities quickly, often referred to as liquidity, plays a
fundamental role in facilitating risk-sharing and allocating resources in asset markets. For example,
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) show that liquidity is a priced factor in stock prices and Gavazza
(2009) shows that liquidity aﬀects asset prices and utilization in the aircraft market. Furthermore,
Levine and Zervos (1998) show that more liquid ﬁnancial markets increase investment, productivity,
and economic growth. Illiquidity can arise for both informational and non-information reasons.
Investor demand to trade quickly may move prices permanently due to information, e.g., Evans
and Lyons (2002), and temporarily for other reasons, e.g., Kraus and Stoll (1972). Investors’
trading demands temporarily distorting prices away from fundamental values, often referred to as
price pressure, has been established in speciﬁc instances, but systematic evidence has been elusive.
We use 12 years of daily position data from intermediaries on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) to measure the amount of liquidity supplied and to characterize the magnitude of price
pressures in terms of size, frequency, and duration; these determine the costs investors face when
trading large quantities and the eﬀect of investor liquidity demand on the eﬃciency of prices. We
also construct a model that identiﬁes the intermediary’s risk aversion and investors’ private value
distribution from the observed time series patterns of price pressures. These enable decomposition
of trading costs and estimation of the social costs (deviations from constrained Pareto eﬃciency)
due to price pressure.
We follow Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) to focus
on the aspect of liquidity associated with temporary price changes induced by order ﬂow (investor
net buying or selling). These price pressures arise from shocks to agents’ consumption, investment,
labor, and other opportunities resulting in liquidity or hedging needs, as in Grossman and Miller
(1988). Asynchronous stochastic arrivals by impatient agents unwilling to bear the costs of con-
stantly monitoring the market naturally leads to an intermediary who stands ready to both buy and
sell (Townsend (1978)). The intermediary oﬀers buyers and sellers quick exchange (Demsetz (1968))
and temporarily leans against the wind to match asynchronously arriving buyers and sellers across
time (Weill (2007)).1 Stoll (1978) and Grossman and Miller (1988) emphasize that price pressure
diﬀers from the bid-ask spread, which measures the intermediary’s return if she simultaneously
1Duﬃe, Gˆ arleanu, and Pedersen (2005) and others model search and trading in decentralized over the counter
markets.
1crosses (executes on both sides of) the trade, one at the bid and the other at the ask.2
Price pressures equilibrate liquidity demand and liquidity supply by compensating liquidity
providers for bearing risk while supplying immediacy to liquidity demanders. Thus, measures of
both liquidity demand and liquidity supply are suitable for characterizing price pressure. Empirical
evidence from situations with large investor liquidity demands demonstrates that price pressures
can be large.3 However, long time series of aggregate investor liquidity demand are not available.
Prior empirical work on liquidity supply using intermediaries’ inventory positions ﬁnds support for
risk management via inventory control, but weak support for inventories causing price pressure.4
To estimate price pressures arising from liquidity supply we employ intermediary data from the
New York Stock Exchange from 1994-2005. Market makers who act as intermediaries to supply
liquidity on the NYSE, called specialists, are required to report their positions in every security
every day. To link these inventory positions with price pressures we use the Kalman ﬁlter to
estimate a state space model that decomposes stock prices into their fundamental value and ‘noise’:
the random walk component and the stationary component. The stationary component represents
pricing error around the fundamental value. The estimation allows the NYSE intermediaries’
inventory level to enter directly into the price equation via the stationary noise component. The
coeﬃcient on inventory represents the transitory impact of a dollar of intermediary inventory, which
we refer to as the conditional price pressure. The standard deviation of the inventory characterizes
the frequency of price pressure. Combining the conditional price pressure with its frequency and
duration yields the average price pressure which we refer to as the transitory volatility due to price
2Grossman and Miller (1988, p.630) also criticize another empirical measure of the liquidity, the liquidity ratio,
which is deﬁned as the ratio of average dollar volume of trading to the average price change during some interval.
The reciprocal of this, often referred to as the illiquidity ratio, is subject to their same critiques.
3Kraus and Stoll (1972) provide some of the ﬁrst evidence on liquidity demands from block trades causing price
pressure. Harris and Gurel (1986) and subsequent papers on additions to the S&P 500 index ﬁnd evidence for price
pressure. Greenwood (2005) extends this with an examination of transitory price eﬀects upon a weighting change to
the Nikkei 225. Coval and Staﬀord (2007) examine price pressures due to mutual fund redemptions. Less directly
Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) examine how price pressures leads to stocks’ return autocorrelations declining
with trading volume. Gabaix, Gopikrishnan, Plerou, and Stanley (2006) examine how price pressures by institutional
investors can theoretically aﬀect stock market volatility. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) provide a theoretical
model where price pressures aﬀect intermediary capital positions due margin requirements. This can require the
intermediary to reduce leverage causing feedback eﬀects in price pressures.
4Madhavan and Smidt (1991), Madhavan and Smidt (1993), and Hasbrouck and Soﬁanos (1993) employ NYSE
intermediary inventory data and ﬁnd evidence supporting risk management, but not price pressure. Hendershott
and Seasholes (2007) use a long time series of NYSE data to ﬁnd cross-sectional evidence of both inventory control
and price pressure: a portfolio of stocks where the intermediary is long outperforms a portfolio of stocks where the
intermediary is short by 45.4 basis points over two weeks. Our ﬁndings extend this portfolio approach to determine
the price pressure per dollar of inventory, the average impact of price pressure on stocks’ volatility, and the social
costs of price pressure.
2pressure.
The conditional price pressure for the largest-quintile stocks is 0.02 basis points per one thousand
dollars of intermediary inventory.5 For the smallest-quintile stocks one thousand dollars of inventory
results in 1.01 basis points of price pressure. The small conditional price pressure in large stocks
is associated with greater frequency of price pressure: the standard deviation of inventory is $1.1
million for the largest stocks versus $165 thousand for the smallest stocks. Inventory positions
causing price pressures last longer in small stocks: the half-life of intermediary inventory is 0.55
days for the largest stocks and 2.11 days for the smallest stocks. Combining the conditional size,
frequency, and duration of price pressures produces estimates of the daily transitory volatility due
to price pressure that range from 0.17% for the largest stocks to 1.20% for smallest stocks. Price
pressure contributes substantially to daily volatility in stock prices in small stocks as the average
ratio of transitory volatility due to price pressure to permanent volatility is greater than one.
To further understand price pressures we construct a single-asset theoretical model of liquidity
supply with stochastically arriving investors with less than perfectly elastic demands to trade. In
the inﬁnite-horizon recursive model the intermediary dynamically chooses the prices at which she
is willing to buy and sell, the bid and ask prices, respectively. When the intermediary is at her
desired inventory position in a security the bid and ask prices symmetrically straddle the security’s
fundamental value. If a seller then arrives the intermediary buys and her position, also referred to
as her inventory level, is higher than desired, exposing her to idiosyncratic price risk. To mitigate
this risk the intermediary then stochastically mean reverts her inventory by applying price pressure:
she adjusts both the bid and ask prices downward to induce more investor buying selling. In doing
this the intermediary bears the cost of setting the average of the bid-ask quotes, the midquote
price, to be below the fundamental value. The size of the deviation of the midquote price from the
fundamental value is our theoretical and empirical measure of price pressure.
The main innovation of our theoretical approach is to facilitate estimation of the risk aversion
of the intermediary and social welfare lost due to deviations from constrained Pareto eﬃciency.
The model together with the time series properties of price pressure identiﬁes low risk aversion for
the intermediaries, a 0.10 coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, and deviations from Pareto eﬃciency
of 0.35 basis points of the value traded. The low risk aversion could arise from risk tolerant capital
5Throughout we focus on the idiosyncratic inventory positions as hedging of the systematic inventory risk can be
accomplished relatively inexpensively via futures and exchange traded funds based on stock market indices.
3migrating to the intermediation sector or be a sign of an agency conﬂict between ﬁrm and the
individual traders it employs to act as intermediaries. If the traders have limited liability, then
they may be willing to take more risky bets than the ﬁrm’s owners would prefer.
1 Empirical price pressure and inventory dynamics
Markets where investors do not continuously monitor and participate deviate from the standard
Walrasian tradition (Townsend (1978), Grossman and Miller (1988), Rust and Hall (2003),a n d
many others). Historically, the NYSE assigns one intermediary, called a specialist, to act as an
market maker for each stock. This structure clearly identiﬁes the amount of liquidity supplied by
an intermediary. We use data on these intermediaries’ inventory positions to identify price pres-
sure both in the cross-section and through time. While the designation of a single intermediary
is relatively unique to the NYSE, the fundamental economic forces that generate prices pressure
and intermediary inventory risk exist in all markets where investor trading needs are not perfectly
synchronized. Section 3 further discusses the NYSE structure and changes to that structure subse-
quent to our sample period. Before any estimations we discuss the data and provide some summary
statistics.
1.1 Data and summary statistics
We use data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), the NYSE’s Trade and
Quotes (TAQ), and a proprietary NYSE dataset to construct the end-of-day midquote price (i.e.,
the average of the bid price and ask price) and NYSE specialist inventory position along with other
variables from 1994 through 2005. We construct a balanced panel to make results comparable
through time and control for stock ﬁxed eﬀects. We start with the sample of all NYSE common
stocks that can be matched across TAQ and CRSP and retain the stocks that are present throughout
the whole sample period. Stocks with an average share price of less than $5 are removed from the
sample, as are stocks with an average share price of more than $1,000. The resulting sample
comprises 697 common stocks. Stocks are sorted into quintiles based on market capitalization.
Quintile 1 refers to the large-cap stocks and quintile 5 corresponds to the small-cap stocks. To
facilitate comparisons across stocks we convert the NYSE specialist position, which is in shares
in the original database, into dollars by multiplying the position times each stock’s average price
4each year.6 This eliminates daily price changes in the inventory variable allowing its use as an
explanatory variable for the transitory price eﬀect in the econometric model. Throughout we use
specialist, market maker, and intermediary interchangeably to refer to the NYSE specialist.
[insert Table 1]
Summary statistics. Table 1 presents the mean of various trading variables by size quintile.
To provide a sense of the variable’s variability through time the within variation, which is deﬁned
as the standard deviation of the data series after removing stock ﬁxed eﬀects, is also included.
Several observations emerge from the statistics. First, the within standard deviation in intermediary
inventory is $1.4 million, which is substantial relative to her average position. It suggests that the
specialist is an active intermediary in matching buyers and sellers at interday horizons. Table 2
subsequently disaggregates this variation by year and by size quintile. Second, while not the focus
of this study, the average position of the intermediary is positive and economically signiﬁcant.7
For example, for the large-cap stocks in Q1 she maintains an almost half a million dollar average
inventory position. The inventory position for the small-cap stocks in Q5 is considerably smaller at
$77,900. Third, the market capitalization is $34 billion for Q1 stocks and declines to $290 million
for Q5 stocks. The eﬀective spread (more precisely referred to the half spread, but for notational
convenience we use spread throughout), which is deﬁned as the distance between the transaction
price and the prevailing midquote price, is 8 basis points for Q1 stocks and 46 basis points for Q5
stocks, demonstrating considerable heterogeneity across stocks.
1.2 State space model to disentangle price pressures and eﬃcient price innova-
tions
One challenge in identifying price pressures is that investors’ net order imbalance, the diﬀerence
between the volume investors buy and sell (which equals the intermediary’s inventory change),
may convey information as well as cause pressure which makes prices ‘overshoot’. This well-known
pattern has been documented in various event studies. For example, Kraus and Stoll (1972) show
6We use the stock-split and dividend information from CRSP to remove these eﬀects from the midquote prices in
TAQ.
7This average long position is likely driven by a combination of a cost asymmetry between long and short position
and capital requirements imposed by the exchange which intermediaries choose invest in stocks. The model in
Section 2 interprets the zero position as the deviation from the long-term optimal position of the intermediary.
5that prices overshoot in the event of a block trade, i.e., a transaction where the initiating party
wants to trade an signiﬁcant number of shares, typically deﬁned as greater than 10,000. They
document the following pattern for block sales where E3 is the immediate total impact of the block
sale, E3 − E2 is the permanent impact, and E2 is the temporary impact (price pressure) from the
sale:
source: Kraus and Stoll (1972, p.575)
To identify the price pressure eﬀect in the presence of an information eﬀect, we use the state space
approach of Menkveld, Koopman, and Lucas (2007) which models an observed, high-frequency price
series as the sum of two unobserved series: a nonstationary eﬃcient price series (‘information’) and
a stationary series that captures transitory price eﬀects (‘price pressures’). We use log prices
throughout the paper and remove a required return by subtracting a linear trend with a slope
equal to the riskfree rate plus beta times a market risk premium of 6%. In its simplest form the
model structure for the detrended log price is:
pt = mt + st, (1)
mt = mt−1 + wt, (2)
where pt is the observed price, mt is the unobserved eﬃcient price, st is the unobserved transitory
price eﬀect, and wt is the innovation in the eﬃcient price. st and wt are mutually uncorrelated
and normally distributed. It is immediate from the structure of the model that only draws on wt
aﬀect the security’s price permanently as any draw on st is temporary as it aﬀects prices only at a
single point in time. The model can be estimated with maximum likelihood where the likelihood
6is calculated by the Kalman ﬁlter. Details on the implementation are in Appendix I.
There are several reasons why the state space methodology is preferable to other approaches
such as generalized method of moments (GMM) or an autoregressive moving average (ARIMA)
model. First, maximum likelihood estimation is asymptotically unbiased and eﬃcient. Second,
the model implies that the diﬀerenced series is an invertible ﬁrst-order moving average (MA(1))
time series model which implies a inﬁnite lag autoregressive (AR) model. This is particularly
cumbersome if the price series (or the inventory series that we will use as explanatory variable for
st) have missing values. The Kalman ﬁlter ensures maximum eﬃciency in dealing with missing
values by not losing any information as it considers the likelihood of all level series changes even
if they extend over multiple periods in the case of missing observations. Any method based on the
diﬀerenced series does not consider that information. Third, after estimation, the Kalman smoother
(essentially a backward recursion after a forward recursion with the Kalman ﬁlter) facilitates a
series decomposition where at any point in time the eﬃcient price and the transitory deviation are
estimated using past and future prices. This allows for an in-sample decomposition of prices which
we will illustrate. Durbin and Koopman (2001) provide an extensive treatment on the use of state
space models to analyze economic times series.
The remainder of this subsection develops the general state space model to be taken to the
data. We ﬁrst develop the latent eﬃcient price process and then the stationary price deviations
that should capture the price pressures that are our focus.
Unobserved eﬃcient price process. We use the model to analyze daily midquote price
series by stock-year. The eﬃcient price series is a martingale that consists of two components:
mit = mi,t−1 + βi ˆ ft + wit,w it = κiˆ Iit + uit (3)
where the subscript i indexes stocks, t indexes days, ˆ ft is a common factor innovation that is
obtained as the residual of an autoregressive time series model applied to the market cap weighted
average of standardized midquote returns (we standardize to control for heteroscedasticity), wit is
the idiosyncratic innovation, ˆ Iit is the idiosyncratic inventory innovation (similar procedures are
used as described for ˆ ft) that represents the ‘surprise’ net order imbalance which is potentially
informative, and uit is the stock-speciﬁc innovation orthogonal to this order imbalance innovation
7and assumed to be a normally distributed white noise process.8 The decomposition of eﬃcient
price innovation into a common factor component (βi ˆ ft) and an idiosyncratic component (wit)i s
relevant for our purposes as the latter represents undiversiﬁable risk for the intermediary. The
common factor risk is easily hedged through highly liquid index products. For the same reason we
remove the common factor from inventory dynamics as the price risk over a market-wide shock to
inventory is similarly easily hedged through index products.
Unobserved transitory price deviations process. We propose the following process for
the stationary price deviations:
sit = αiIit + β0
i ˆ ft + ···+ βk
i ˆ ft−k + εit (4)
where the error term εit is normally distributed and uncorrelated with wit. Inventory enters as
an explanatory factor to allow price pressure to originate from the intermediary’s desire to mean
revert inventory (Section 2 provides a simple dynamic model generating such a linear structure).
The f terms enter to capture a documented lagged adjustment to common factor innovation that is
particularly prevalent for less actively traded small-stocks (see, e.g., Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay
(1997)). In the proposed speciﬁcation the beta coeﬃcient in the eﬃcient price process captures the
long-term impact of a common factor shock on the price of the security and any lagged adjustment
shows up through negative beta coeﬃcients in the transitory price eﬀects equation.
Observed price process. We close the econometric model with the observation equation:
pit = mit + sit. (5)
As we intend to analyze price pressures in the cross-section as well as in the time dimension
all empirical analysis are done by stock-year. To report the 697*12 stock-year results we aggre-
gate stocks into quintile bins according to their size. The allocation across size quintiles is ﬁxed
throughout the sample so as to ensure that bins are comparable across years. Means are calculated
for each bin along with the number of t-statistics that are outside of the 0.10 to 0.90 quantile
interval. These t-statistics are available as supplementary material on the authors’ websites. The
8While not the focus of the paper, it is worth noting that the idiosyncratic inventory innovation term in the
martingale equation eliminates a potential ‘omitted variable bias’ as the explanatory variable for the eﬃcient price
innovation (wt) correlates with the explanatory variable for price pressure (st), i.e., the order imbalance innovation
(unexpected change in inventory) in period t correlates with inventory at time t (which is at the end of period t).
8tables report the p-value of a meta test statistic that counts the number of signiﬁcant t-values in
a size-year bin (and in the aggregation across bins). This statistic is binomially distributed where
the probability of ‘success’ equals the signiﬁcance level of the t-test performed for each stock-year
estimation, i.e., 0.20 in our two-tailed test.9
Time series statistics as preliminary evidence on price pressures. Before turning
to the state space model estimates, some straightforward time series statistics are useful to test
whether the signs of the price eﬀects that we are after are present in the data.
[insert Table 2]
Panels A and B of Table 2 reports ﬁrst and second order autocorrelation of idiosyncratic midquote
returns. The eﬀects of contemporaneous and lagged adjustment to the common factor innovation
are removed by regressing the midquote return on the common factor innovation up to four lags.
The residuals serve as the idiosyncratic returns. Consistent with the individual stocks autocor-
relation results in Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) the average ﬁrst order autocorrelation is
negative in 64 of the 70 size-year bins. The low p-values indicate that the coeﬃcient estimates are
signiﬁcant at conventional signiﬁcance levels.10 The negative ﬁrst order autocorrelation is consis-
tent with transitory price eﬀects as the simple state space model of equations (1)a n d( 2) implies a
negative ﬁrst-order correlation in midquote returns. The table further shows that the second order
autocorrelation is also signiﬁcantly negative which indicates that price pressures may carry over
days rather than being an ultra-high-frequency intraday phenomenon. This also implies that the
unconditional transitory deviations are potentially much larger relative to fundamental volatility
than the simple ﬁrst-order autocorrelations suggest.11
Panels C, D, and E of Table 2 further reports the standard deviation of intermediary inventory,
its autocorrelation, and a cross-correlation with subsequent midquote returns as preliminary evi-
dence on the conjectured relation between transitory price deviations and inventory. The standard
9Correlation across stocks is limited by the empirical analysis’ focus on idiosyncratic eﬀects by removing a common
factor in both the price and in the inventory series.
10Overall, 3525 t-values are signiﬁcant and 4836 t-values are insigniﬁcant. The sign of the signiﬁcant t-values is
primarily negative (2427 negative vs. 1098 positive) which shows that the negative means are statistically signiﬁcant.
We omit extensive statistical signiﬁcance discussion in the remainder of the document for brevity.
11If the stationary term follows an AR(1) process, st = ϕst−1 + εt, the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation in midquote
returns is:
ρ1 =
−(1 − ϕ)σ
2
ε
(1 + ϕ)σ2
w +2 σ2
ε
where ϕ is the autoregressive coeﬃcient in the st process. The more persistent the price pressure, higher ϕ, the less
negative the return autocorrelation becomes.
9deviation of intermediary end-of-day inventory is $1.131 million for the large-cap stocks and mono-
tonically decreases to $165,000 for the small-cap stocks. It is relatively constant throughout time
but tapers oﬀ in the last few years in the sample. The cross-sectional variation is undoubtedly due
to a higher fundamental volatility and a smaller less active market for small-cap stocks. In this
case, the intermediary will shy away from frequent and large nonzero inventory positions, e.g., see
the model proposed in Section 2.
The inventory volatility is roughly twice the mean inventory across all quintiles. This is evi-
dence of active intermediation across days as inventory management is not a phenomenon that is
restricted to the intraday ultra-high frequency level where intermediaries ‘go home ﬂat.’ The table
further documents a signiﬁcant ﬁrst order autocorrelation in inventories which show that these
positions can last for multiple days. Again, there is considerable cross-sectional variation as the
average autocorrelation for the large-cap stocks is 0.28 which monotonically increases to an average
autocorrelation of 0.72 for small-cap stocks, corresponding to inventory half-lives of 0.55 days for
the largest stocks and 2.11 days for the smallest stocks.12 The intermediary seems to trade out of
most of an end-of-day position in the course of the next day for the large-cap stocks, whereas it
take multiple days for the small-cap stocks. Finally, we calculate the correlation between today’s
inventory position and tomorrow’s midquote return to verify whether the two sets of results in
the table can be reconciled. The last panel in the table shows that today’s inventory position
correlates signiﬁcantly with tomorrow’s midquote return. The positive signs are consistent with
models of intermediary risk management as the intermediary applies price pressure by lowering the
midquote price on a long position (relative to the long-term average) which elicits an order imbal-
ance (more investor buying than selling) that mean reverts her inventory and, as a consequence,
leads to smaller price pressure. This creates a positive correlation between today’s position and
tomorrow’s midquote return.
State space model estimates. Before presenting the general state space model deﬁned by
equations (3), (4), and (5), we illustrate the idea of the model graphically. The equations relate the
permanent price change Δmt and transitory price eﬀect st to the intermediary’s inventory series.
12These inventory autocorrelations are lower than the puzzlingly large autocorrelations found in NYSE data from
the late 1980s and early 1990s in Madhavan and Smidt (1993) and Hasbrouck and Soﬁanos (1993).
10Initially, we do not use inventory data to estimate the reduced version of the model:
pit = mit + sit (6)
mit = mi,t−1 + βi ˆ ft + wit (7)
sit = ϕisi,t−1 + β0
i ˆ ft + ···+ β3
i ˆ ft−3 + εit (8)
where the AR(1) process for sit allows transitory price eﬀects to be persistent as suggested by the
negative second order auto correlations in returns (Panel B of Table 2) and the inventory persistence
(Panel D of Table 2). Model estimates by stock-year are in the supplementary material.
[insert Figure 1]
Figure 1 illustrates the model estimates for twenty trading days in a representative stock (Rex
Stores Corporation, ticker RSC, CRSP PERMNO 68830) starting January 14, 2002. It exploits
one attractive feature of the state space approach, which is that conditional on the model’s param-
eter estimates the Kalman smoother generates estimates of the unobserved eﬃcient price and the
transitory price pressure processes conditional on all observations. In other words, it uses past and
future prices to estimate the eﬃcient price mit and the temporary price deviation sit at any time t
in the sample. The ﬁrst graph plots the observed midquote price and the eﬃcient price estimate.
It illustrates that price deviations from fundamental value are economically large—hundreds of
basis points—and persistent as they appear to last for multiple days. The second graph plots the
diﬀerential between the observed price and the eﬃcient price estimate, i.e., the price pressure, along
with the intermediary’s inventory deviation from its long-term mean. The clear negative correlation
between the two series is consistent with the intermediary using price pressure to mean-revert her
inventory towards its desired level. The third graph plots the innovation in eﬃcient price Δmt
against the contemporaneous ‘surprise’ idiosyncratic inventory change which is obtained as the
residual of an AR(9) model. It indicates that unexpected order ﬂow is informative on the eﬃcient
price. A surprise positive inventory change indicates unexpected selling by liquidity demanders
which changes the eﬃcient price downwards as the selling might have been driven by information.
These observations are now tested rigorously by estimating the state space model with inventory
data.
[insert Table 3]
11Table 3 reports the estimates of the general state space model deﬁned by equations (3), (4),
and (5). In Panel A the key parameter αi that measures the conditional price pressure has the
conjectured negative sign and is statistically signiﬁcant as 4045 t-values are signiﬁcantly negative,
4051 are insigniﬁcant, and only 265 are signiﬁcantly positive. Prices are low when the intermediary
is on a long position and high when she is on a short position relative to her long-term mean
inventory. Conditional price pressure exhibits substantial cross-sectional variation as αi is -0.02 for
the large-cap stocks and -1.01 for the small-cap stocks. These numbers are economically signiﬁcant
as a $1.131 million (one standard deviation) position change in intermediary inventory creates a
price pressure of 1131*0.02=17 basis points (cf. eﬀective half-spread of 8 basis points, see Table 1).
A similar position change in the small-cap stocks would create a price pressure of 1131*1.01=1142
basis points or 11.42%!
Panel B of Table 3 further shows that the average price pressure varies less in the cross-section
than the conditional price pressure. The average pressure which is measured as the conditional
pressure times the standard deviation of inventory is 17 basis points for the large-cap stocks and
120 basis points for the low-cap stocks. The conditional pressure is roughly 7 times higher for the
small-cap stocks relative to the large-cap stocks whereas the conditional pressure is 50 times higher
with the diﬀerence attributable to the intermediary taking smaller positions in the smaller stocks.
Panel F also reports the size of these average price pressures relative to permanent volatility. The
variance ratio is 0.02 for the large-cap stocks which indicates that these price pressures are small
relative to fundamental volatility. In contrast the small-cap stock variance ratio is 1.32, implying
transitory volatility due to price pressures is larger than fundamental volatility. Finally, the average
price pressure variance identiﬁed using inventories is almost half of the transitory price deviations
variance in the model that does not use inventory data (equations (6)-(8), see supplementary
material for estimation details). The ratio is (49/75)2 =0 .42 which could be interpreted as an ‘R2’.
Consistent with earlier empirical work (for example, Hasbrouck (1991)), unexpected inventory
changes, which equal unexpected investor buying or selling, explain a signiﬁcant part of eﬃcient
price innovations. The κi estimates in Panel C are -0.35 on average and highly signiﬁcant as 6602
t-values are signiﬁcantly negative, 1631 are insigniﬁcant, and only 128 are signiﬁcantly positive. In
Panel D the average explained permanent volatility—κi times the standard deviation of unexpected
inventory changes—is 56 basis points. This compares to an average total permanent volatility of
12177 basis points in Panel E.
2 A simple dynamic inventory control model to interpret the time
series properties of price pressure
This section models the intermediary’s dynamic inventory control policy as a ‘stochastic optimal
linear regulator’ (SOLR) problem (see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, p.112)). A representative
intermediary faces stochastically arriving investors with elastic liquidity demands. The solution
characterizes a stationary distribution for price pressures which along with the empirical results in
the previous section, enables identiﬁcation of the intermediary’s relative risk aversion and liquidity
demanders’ private value distribution. It also allows for an analysis of the costs of trading and
social welfare. Given that the model assumes investors arrive asynchronously, ﬁrst-best is not
achievable, so our social welfare analysis focuses on deviations from constrained Pareto eﬃciency;
for expositional ease we will often omit constrained when discussing Pareto eﬃciency.
To ﬁt the SOLR approach we assume that: (i) liquidity demand which determines the interme-
diary’s buy and sell volume is exogenous and normally distributed with a mean that is linear in the
bid and ask price, respectively, (ii) the intermediary is a mean-variance optimizer over nonstorable
consumption,13 and (iii) a security position exposes the intermediary to fundamental value risk
which is modeled as a normally distributed stochastic dividend to avoid a notational burden.14
The fundamental value of the security, mt in the empirical model, is set to zero.
The model is inspired by Ho and Stoll (1981) who frame dynamic inventory control in a standard
macro model of a CRRA utility intermediary who controls the public buy and sell rate which are
linear in her ask and bid price quotes. The intermediary solves a dynamic program to maximize
terminal wealth. We deviate by setting up the problem as an inﬁnite horizon one so as to generate
a stationary distribution for price pressure that can be compared to the empirical estimates.
13Cochrane (2001, p.155) also considers quadratic utility a natural starting point when he introduces dynamic
programming. Madhavan and Smidt (1993) model inventory as having quadratic holding costs. Lagos, Rocheteau,
and Weill (2009) model liquidity provision where intermediaries maximize over nonstorable consumption.
14The stochastic dividend minimizes accounting in the model, but, as Ho and Stoll (1981, p.52) emphasize, no
sources of uncertainty are ignored. These assumptions have several implications. First, the nonstorable consumption
removes the ability of the intermediary to precautionary save and smooth consumption. Second, quadratic utility
leads to risk aversion that increases with wealth. Third, the normality assumption for public buy and sell volume
implies that they could become negative. To show that the model’s predicted price pressure dynamics is robust, we
also numerically solve an inﬁnite horizon ‘Ho and Stoll’ model in the supplementary material.
132.1 The environment
Time is discrete and inﬁnite. There is one durable asset that produces a perishable and stochastic
(num´ eraire) consumption good. An inﬁnitely-lived intermediary supplies liquidity by standing
ready to buy or sell the asset to outside investors who demand liquidity. At the start of each period
a single intermediary quotes an ask price at which she commits to sell and a bid price at which she
commits to buy.
Reduced form liquidity demand. Liquidity demand is characterized by the primitive
parameters λ, which is the aggregate amount of all investors’ private values to trade per unit
of time, and θ, which captures the dispersion of private values across investors. Investor buying
and selling are determined by the intermediary’s bid price, s − δ, and ask price, s + δ, which
are characterized by price pressure s, which is pt − mt in the state space model, and the bid-ask
spread of 2δ. Speciﬁcally, investor buying and selling demand for liquidity are normally distributed
variables linear in the bid-ask quotes:15
qs(s,δ)=λθ

1 − θ(s + δ)

+ εs,ε s ∼ N

0,
1
2
σ2
ε

, (9)
qb(s,δ)=λθ

1+θ(s − δ)

+ εb,ε b ∼ N

0,
1
2
σ2
ε

, (10)
where εs and εb are independent of each other and identically and independently distributed (IID)
each period. The environment is best illustrated by the two graphs below where graph (i) illus-
trates liquidity demand ‘distribution’ over private values and graph (ii) depicts how such demand
translates into an expected investor buy rate, which equals the intermediary sell rate, that is linear
in the ask price.
The intermediary’s liquidity supply. The intermediary is risk-averse and therefore dislikes
the risky dividend associated with a nonzero inventory position. She solves the following inﬁnite-
15These distributions can arise from an economy where each time period each of a ﬁnite number N of investors
each owning
1
N units of the asset receives a shock to their private value to trade with probability 2λθ. Common
interpretations of such shocks are that investors have hedging or liquidity needs from which they derive private values
(Grossman and Miller (1988)). Private value shocks are uniformly distributed on support [−
1
θ,
1
θ]. If the intermediary
quotes an ask price of (s+δ) investors’ sell volume is distributed
1
N times a binomial random variable with parameters
(N,λθ(1−θ(s+δ))). The binomial distribution for intermediary sell volume can then be approximated by a normal
distribution with the same mean but with variance equal to
1
2σ
2
ε. Buy volume is similarly distributed.
14−1
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1
θ
arrival rate
λθ2
hedge value
δ
price
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(i) mean demand per private value (ii) mean public buy volume as function of ask price
horizon dynamic program:
vi0 = max
{st(it),δt(it)}∞
t=0
∞ 
t=0
Ei0

βt((ct −
1
2
λ) −
1
2
˜ γ(ct −
1
2
λ)2)

(11)
where it represents the history of her inventory position through time t and Ei0(.) is the expectation
operator conditional on starting oﬀ with inventory position i0. The quadratic utility parametriza-
tion is such that the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of (absolute) risk aversion (ARA) is ˜ γ at 1
2λ which is
the expected consumption of a monopolistic risk-neutral intermediary. The intermediary’s actual
consumption in period t equals net trading revenue plus the stochastic dividend:
ct =( st + δt)qs(st,δ t) − (st − δt)qb(st,δ t)+itΔmt+1, (12)
=2 λθ(δt − θ(s2
t + δ2
t)) + s(εst − εbt)+δ(εst + εbt)+itΔmt+1, Δmt+1 ∼ N(0,σ2)
where Δmt+1 is the stochastic dividend at the start of period t + 1 (which runs from t to t +1 ) .
Consumption mean and variance therefore equal:
E(ct)=2 λθ(δt − θ(s2
t + δ2
t)) (13)
var(ct)=σ2
ε(s2
t + δ2
t)+σ2i2
t (14)
The law of motion for inventory follows from the net trade in the asset:
it+1 = it − qs(st,δ t)+qb(st,δ t)=it +2 λθ2st − εst + εbt (15)
A ﬁnal step simpliﬁes the problem in two ways. First, the expected utility expression is linearized
15in mean and variance by a ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion around the average risk-neutral consumption
1
2λ. This removes the quadratic conditional mean which would make the objective function fourth
order and therefore impossible to solve with standard techniques. Second, we omit the impact of σ2
ε
in the variance of consumption, equation (14), to focus on how prices reﬂect the dynamic trade-oﬀ
between the intermediary’s expected cost of a pressured price and its beneﬁt of mean-reverting
risky inventory. Omission of the consumption variance eﬀect is innocuous if the pain of liquidity
demand uncertainty (as captured by 1
2˜ γσ2
ε) is small relative to the expected revenue loss due to
price pressure (as captured by 2λθ2). The ﬁnal speciﬁcation of the dynamic program is therefore:
vi0 = max
{st(it),δt(it)}∞
t=0
∞ 
t=0
βtEi0

2λθδt − 2λθ2(s2
t + δ2
t)) −
1
2
˜ γσ2i2
t

(16)
it+1 = it +2 λθ2st + εt,ε t ∼ N(0,σ2
ε). (17)
2.2 The recursive form, the closed-form solution, and its characteristics
The IID character of net liquidity demand uncertainty (εt) and stochastic dividend (Δmt+1) allows
for a recursive formulation of the dynamic program. The intermediary solves the following Bellman
equation:
vi = max
{p,δ}
Ei0

2λθδ − 2λθ2(s2 + δ2) −
1
2
˜ γσ2i2 + βvi 

(18)
i  = i +2 λθ2s + ε. (19)
Standard solution techniques yield the following solution:
vi =
λ
2(1 − β)
− P(i2 +
β
1 − β
σ2
ε) (20)
s∗ = αi, α ≡
−1
1
βP + Q
(21)
δ∗ =
1
2θ
(22)
where (s∗,δ∗) denote the optimal prices controls and
P ≡
−(1 − β)+βRQ+

(1 − β)2 +2 β(1 + β)QR + β2Q2R2
2βQ
,Q ≡ 2λθ2,R ≡
1
2
˜ γσ2. (23)
16Time series properties of price pressure. The solution to the intermediary’s control
problem implies linear dynamics for price pressure (s) and inventory which matches the econometric
model that was taken to the data. More speciﬁcally, price pressure is linear in inventory (equation
(21)) and inventory is characterized by ﬁrst-order autoregressive process:
it =
βPQ
1+βPQ
it−1 + εt = −Qαit−1 + εt. (24)
Orthogonality of the spread and optimal inventory control. The intermediary’s
pricing strategy decomposes into two orthogonal strategies. First, she sets a spread that exploits
her monopolistic pricing power vis-` a-vis the investors. Second, she uses price pressure (the midquote
price) to optimally mean-revert her inventory. Mathematically, the control strategy orthogonalizes
as the spread does not enter the speed of mean-reversion and the spread is constant across inventory
states.16 This critically depends on the assumption that public buy and sell volume are linear in
prices (see equation (9)a n d( 10)).
The orthogonality result implies (i) that price pressure, not spread, should be the focus of a study
on dynamic inventory control by an agent who intermediates nonsynchronous buy and sell volume
and (ii) that a competitive equilibrium can be characterized. If the ‘representative’ intermediary
becomes a price-taker and entry drives rents to zero, then the candidate pricing function is equal to
the price pressure exercised by the monopolistic intermediary with a spread exactly compensating
for the cost of the stochastic dividend on nonzero inventory positions. From this we can calculate
the model-implied competitive spread and compare it with the observed spread.
2.3 Identiﬁcation of the model’s primitive parameters
The remainder of the section uses the state space model estimates to identify the model’s primitive
parameters, calculates an model-implied competitive spread and ﬁnally, in the next subsection,
analyzes Pareto eﬃciency.
[insert Table 4]
Table 4 summarizes all results with a repeat of the empirical results in Table 3 needed for
identiﬁcation of the model’s primitive parameters. To separately identify the λ and θ parameters,
16Zabel (1981) and Mildenstein and Schleef (1983) ﬁnd the spread is independent of inventory. Ho and Stoll (1981)
ﬁnd inventory has a very small eﬀect on the spread.
17which characterize investors’ demand for liquidity, trading volume and spread are needed. See
Appendix II for detailed calculations. The only additional parameter needed is discount factor (β)
which is assumed to be equal to the risk-free rate.
Competitive spread required to compensate for inventory risk. Equation (20)s h o w s
that the value of being a liquidity supplier naturally decomposes into a discounted expected revenue
due to earning the bid-ask spread (ﬁrst term) and a discounted cost due to price risk associated
with nonzero inventory (second term). The annuity value of the inventory risk compensation equals
βPσ2
ε if the intermediary starts with zero inventory (which is assumed for the remainder of the
section). The model-implied conditional price pressure and inventory mean-reversion as described
by equations (21)a n d( 24) identify the factor βPQ. The remaining factor σ2
ε follows directly
from inventory variance and mean-reversion, i.e., σ2
ε =( 1− ρI)σ2(I), where ρI is the ﬁrst-order
autocorrelation of inventory. This daily value divided by the intermediated daily volume naturally
deﬁnes the ‘competitive spread’.
Panel B of Table 4 reveals that the median model-implied competitive spread is 7.32 basis
points for the largest-cap stocks and monotonically increases to 73.16 basis points for the smallest-
cap stocks.17 These results do not use actually observed spread, but are identiﬁed solely from
conditional price pressure and inventory dynamics. It is reassuring that the model-implied spread
is of the same magnitude as the observed spread. It is slightly below for largest-cap stocks (7.32
vs. 8.41 basis points) and increases to a roughly 50% higher for the smallest-cap stocks (73.16 vs.
46.12 basis points). The diﬀerential is potentially due to a specialist privilege during the sample
period where she could see the incoming order ﬂow and limit her trading with privately-informed
order ﬂow (see, e.g., Rock (1990)). This privilege is particularly valuable for small-caps which are
relatively more opaque. The observed spread is net of the value of such privilege (given that access
to specialist seats is competitive) and, therefore, can be lower than the competitive spread.
The model’s primitive parameters. All primitive parameters are identiﬁed if in addition
to the terms identiﬁed in the previous section (βP, Q,a n dσ2
ε), one uses the reciprocal of the
gross riskfree rate (from Kenneth French’s website) for the discount factor β, uses the empirical
random-walk volatility (σ(w)) for the fundamental price risk (σ), and uses the observed empirical
17For the remainder of the section medians and interquartile ranges (Q0.75 − Q0.25) are reported as the model-
implied variables are nonlinear functions of the empirical estimates (with estimates in denominators) which creates
numerical problems. Medians and interquartile ranges are robust to these issues.
18results on intermediated daily volume (specialist particip∗daily volume) and the eﬀective spread
(espread).18 Appendix II summarizes all variables identiﬁed in this section and expresses them
in terms of the previous section’s empirical estimates. The private value rate λ is highest for
the largest-cap stocks: $56,690 per stock per day. It decreases monotonically to $1,460 for the
smallest-cap stocks. Private value dispersion 1
θ is 171 basis points for largest-cap stocks, 135 for
second largest-cap stocks and then increase monotonically to 307 basis points for smallest-cap
stocks.
We calculate the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (γ) by dividing ˜ γ by the intermediaries
expected consumption at the competitive spread. The median relative risk aversion declines mono-
tonically from 0.24 for the largest-cap stocks to 0.05 for the smallest-cap stocks with the diﬀerences
across quintiles small relative to the interquartile ranges within each quintile. The overall median
of 0.10 is low relative to relative risk aversion estimated from asset, insurance, and labor markets
(e.g., Mehra and Prescott (1985), Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997), Chetty (2006),a n d
Cohen and Einav (2007)). The low risk aversion could arise from risk tolerant capital migrating to
the intermediation sector or be a sign of an agency conﬂict between ﬁrm and the individual traders
it employs to act as intermediaries. If the traders have limited liability, then they may be willing
to take more risky bets than the ﬁrm’s owners would prefer. It is also possible that our structural
model underestimates true risk aversion as the model ignores increased net demand uncertainty
associated with price pressure (see related discussion in Section 2.1).
2.4 Deadweight loss due to Pareto ineﬃciency
The intermediary trades oﬀ the expected cost of price pressure against the beneﬁt of inventory mean-
reversion. The left-hand side graph in the ﬁgure below depicts the expected cost of a negative price
pressure s (due to a positive inventory). The ask price is lowered and the light gray area above the
horizontal axis indicates the additional expected revenue due to more public buying. The lowered
price also reduces the margin on all buys which is indicated by an expected loss equal to the dark
gray area above the axis. Similar areas are drawn for the lowered bid price. Overall, the diﬀerential
between the light and dark gray areas is the expected revenue decline due to price pressure. The
size of this area equals the 2λθ2s2 cost in the intermediary’s Bellman equation (see equation (18)).
18The identiﬁcation of λ and θ relies primarily on trading volume and is relatively insensitive to the spread.
19The right-hand side graph shows that the liquidity demanders beneﬁt as the discount they
enjoy when buying exceeds the lower price they receive when selling. The diﬀerence equals half the
intermediary’s cost of price pressure: λθ2s2. The daily annuity value of the net subsidy is obtained
recursively (see Appendix III) and, when divided by daily intermediated volume, equals 0.58 basis
points for the largest-cap stocks (8% of their competitive spread) and 15.52 basis points for the
smallest-cap stocks (21% of their competitive spread).
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The intermediary only experiences the cost of lost revenue due to price pressure and does not
internalize the beneﬁt it creates for liquidity demanders which, most likely, makes allocations Pareto
ineﬃcient.19 The adjective ‘constrained’ is used here to emphasize that the ﬁrst-best of synchronous
arrivals eliminating the need for intermediation is not attained. A social planner might Pareto
improve by making the intermediary suﬀer the net surplus destroyed by price pressure rather than
her private revenue loss (i.e., the sum of graphs (i) and (ii) rather than graph (i)). This true social
cost is λθ2s2 as depicted in the following graph. Solving the ‘social planner dynamic program’
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19See Weill (2007) and Lagos, Rocheteau, and Weill (2009) for models with conditions where the intermediation
sector does and does not achieve Pareto eﬃcient.
20yields a solution similar to the intermediary’s solution where P in equation (23) is replaced by ˜ P:
˜ P =
−(1 − β)+2 βRQ+

(1 − β)2 +4 β(1 + β)QR +4 β2Q2R2
4βQ
(25)
Panel C of Table 4 shows that the social planner’s implied ‘competitive spread’ is 6.45 basis points
for the largest-cap stocks and increases to 54.77 basis points for the smallest-cap stocks. The gain
relative to the net spread paid by the liquidity demander in the intermediary’s solution (i.e., net
of the subsidy) is 0.05 basis points (0.8% of the competitive spread) for Q1 stocks and 2.58 basis
points (4.5% of the competitive spread) for Q5 stocks.
3 Price pressure and NYSE market structure
When interpreting our results it is worth discussing the institutional structure of the specialist
intermediary at the NYSE. Historically, the NYSE granted the specialists a central position in
the trading process and imposed obligations upon the specialists. Panayides (2007) shows that
the most signiﬁcant obligation, the Price Continuity Rule which ‘requires the specialist to smooth
transaction prices by providing extra liquidity as necessary to keep transaction price changes small,’
is important at the transaction-level horizon. Panayides ﬁnds that the rule causes specialists to
accumulate inventory to prevent ‘transaction prices from overshooting beyond their equilibrium
levels’. This causes inventories to be positively associated with transitory price eﬀects, the opposite
of our relation between intermediary inventory and price pressure. Therefore, if the Price Continuity
Rule manifests itself at a daily frequency it causes underestimation of price pressures associated
with inventory.
While the NYSE designates a single intermediary for each stock, it is possible for other investors
to compete with the specialist by placing limit orders to supply liquidity. Such a possibility is
especially important given the NYSE’s recent market structure changes (after our sample period)
which resulted in a reduced role for the specialist (Hendershott and Moulton (2007)). Additional
liquidity suppliers could reduce the width of the bid-ask spread and could also reduce the social
costs of intermediaries bearing risk. The most eﬃcient manner to share risk is for the inventory
to be immediately and equally shared across all liquidity suppliers, leading to perfectly correlated
positions. How would this aﬀect our estimates of price pressure? First, the conditional price
21pressure per unit of inventory (α) should be adjusted by the specialist’s fraction of inventory, e.g.,
if the specialist carries one half of the total inventory then the conditional price pressure should
be multiplied by one half. The average price pressure (ασ(I))is unaﬀected by additional liquidity
suppliers because the standard deviation of inventory is adjusted by the reciprocal of the adjustment
to the conditional price pressure. The model-implied primitive parameters and the analysis of the
spread (as summarized in Panel B and C of Table 4) are robust to this bias except for the private
value rate λ which has to be adjusted by the reciprocal of the adjustment to the conditional price
pressure.
4 Conclusion
Empirically we use 12 years of NYSE intermediary data to estimate price pressure—the deviation
of prices from fundamental values due to the inventory risks born by an intermediary providing
liquidity to asynchronously arriving investors. We construct a theoretical model to understand and
characterize the eﬀects of price pressure. The structure of the model allows for estimation of the
intermediary’ risk aversion and social costs of price pressure. We ﬁnd:
1. A $100,000 inventory shock causes price pressure of 1.01% for the small-capitalization stocks
and 0.02% for the large-cap stocks.
2. The daily transitory volatility in stock returns due to price pressure (a measure of average
price pressure) is large: 1.20% and 0.17% for small and large stocks, respectively. For small
stocks the ratio of transitory volatility due to price pressure to the permanent (random-walk
or eﬃcient price) volatility is greater than one.
3. The model together with the time series properties of price pressure identiﬁes low risk aver-
sion for the intermediaries, a 0.10 coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, and deviations from
constrained Pareto eﬃciency of 0.35 basis points of the value traded.
The signiﬁcant size of price pressure suggest that a goal of ﬁnancial market regulation should
be to mitigate price pressure (see also SEC (2010)). One way to do this is by increasing capital for
intermediation as the greater the risk bearing capacity of the intermediaries the smaller the price
pressure. Another approach would be to lower costs for investors to monitor the market. This
22would lead to investor trading being more responsive to price pressures, reducing the duration of
price pressure by allowing intermediaries to mean-revert their inventories more quickly.
Appendix I: Details on the likelihood optimization
The likelihood of the state space model described by equations (3-5) is optimized in the three below steps to
minimize the probability of ﬁnding a local maximum. The optimization is implemented in Ox using standard
optimization routines. The Kalman ﬁlter routines are from ssfpack which is an add-on package in Ox (see
Koopman, Shephard, and Doornik (1999)).
1. An OLS regression of the log price series ﬁrst diﬀerence on contemporaneous and lagged ˆ ft yields
starting values for βi and β0
i ,...,βk
i (see equations (3)-(4)). These β estimates are ﬁxed at these
values until the ﬁnal step.
2. The likelihood is calculated using the Kalman ﬁlter (see Durbin and Koopman (2001)) and optimized
numerically using the quasi-Newton method developed by Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfarb, and Shanno.
In the optimization all parameters are free except for the βsa n d( σ(ε), ϕ) which are ﬁxed at values that
are picked from a nine by nine grid. ϕ ranges from 0 to 0.8 and σ(ε) ranges from 0 to a stock-speciﬁc
upper bound that is calculated assuming that 80% of a stock’s unconditional variance is price pressure.
The likelihoods are compared across all 9*9=81 optimizations and the (σ(ε), ϕ) value that yields the
highest likelihood is kept as starting value for the ﬁnal optimization. The rationale for this step is
to prevent numerical instability of the quasi-Newton optimization. That is, if all parameters are free
on arbitrary starting values the optimization routine often runs oﬀ to a persistence parameter ϕ that
approaches one and a price pressure volatility that approaches the stock’s unconditional volatility, i.e.,
it starts to load the observed price series on two nonstationary series (i.e., the eﬃcient price and the
price pressure) and becomes unstable.
The Kalman ﬁlter is initialized with a diﬀuse distribution for the unobserved eﬃcient price m0 and
the unconditional price pressure distribution for s0, i.e., s0 ∼ N(0,
σ
2(ε)
1−ϕ2).
3. The likelihood is optimized where all parameters are free and starting values for (βi,β0
i ,...,βk
i ,σ(ε),ϕ)
are equal to those found in steps 1 and 2.
This procedure proves numerically stable as we have strong convergence in the likelihood optimization for
all of our stock-year samples, i.e., convergence both in (i) the likelihood elasticity w.r.t. the parameters and
(ii) the one-step change in parameter values (they both become arbitrarily small).
23Appendix II
This appendix identiﬁes the primitive parameters as functions of the empirical results documented in Tables 1,
2,a n d3. They are identiﬁed by matching the observed time series pattern of price pressure (‘αiIit’) of
Section 1 to the stationary distribution of price pressure (‘αi’) implied by the model’s closed-form solution
of Section 2. In addition, trading volume is needed to separate the λ and θ parameters which characterize
investors’ demand for liquidity. To do this we must incorporate the fact that not all investor trading
occurs via the intermediary. To correct for this we use the volume intermediated by the specialist, denote
ν in the equations below, which is the fraction of trading volume in which the specialist is a participant,
specialist particip, times the total trading volume, dollar volume. The eﬀective (half-)spread is denoted δe.
The expressions for the model’s primitive parameters are:
λ =
(−α ∗ ν + δe ∗ (1 − ρI))2
2 ∗ (−α) ∗ (1 − ρI)
(26)
where ρI denotes the ﬁrst-order autoregressive coeﬃcient for inventory,
1
θ
=
−α ∗ ν + δe ∗ (1 − ρI)
1 − ρI
(27)
γ =
2 ∗ ( 1
β − ρI) ∗ α2 ∗ (1 − ρ2
I) ∗ σ2(I)
ρ2
I ∗ σ2(w)
(28)
The analysis of the spread uses:
comp spread =
−α ∗ (1 − ρ2
I) ∗ σ2(I)
ρI ∗ ν
(29)
subsidy =
−α ∗ β ∗ (1 − ρI) ∗ (1 − ρ2
I) ∗ σ2(I)
2 ∗ (1 − β ∗ ρ2
I) ∗ ν
(30)
pareto eff spread =
−α ∗ (−(1 − β)+2 βRQ+

(1 − β)2 +4∗ β ∗ (1 + β) ∗ RQ +4∗ β2 ∗ (RQ)2) ∗ (1 − ρ2
I) ∗ σ2(I)
4 ∗ (1 − ρI) ∗ ν
(31)
where
RQ ≡ (
1
β ∗ ρI
− 1) ∗ (1 − ρI) (32)
24Appendix III: Value of price pressure discount enjoyed by liquidity
demander
Let wi be the expected value of the price pressure discount enjoyed by the liquidity demander when the
intermediary starts on an inventory of i. The Markovian law of motion for the intermediary’s inventory
position allows for Bellmanizing this value as follows:
wi =E i[
1
2
Qs2 + βwi] (33)
Assume wi = A + Bi2 and calculate wi from equation (33):
A + Bi2 = wi =
1
2
Qα2i2 + βEi[A + B(i + Qαi + ε)2]=

βA+ βBσ2
ε

+
1
2
Qα2 + βB(1 + Qα)2
i2 (34)
A and B are solved by matching the constant and the coeﬃcient of i2 on both sides of the equation.
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28Table 2: Price and inventory mean reversion estimates by year and size quintile
This table estimates the dynamics of log prices and intermediary inventories as well as their interaction. A common
factor, ˆ ft which is the cross-sectional mean each day of the standardized series, is removed from both series. For
example, for each stock, each year we multiply specialist inventory in shares by the average price and then regress it
on ˆ ft. The residuals from this regression are the idiosyncratic component of specialist inventory in dollars, Iit.F o r
various dependent and independent variables we perform the following regressions by size quintile (Q1 contains the
largest stocks) and by year:
yit = αi + βixit + εit
The table reports p-values in brackets. These p-values are based on a test statistic that counts the number of
signiﬁcant t-values across all stock-year estimates in the bin. The test statistic is binomially distributed under the
null (we use the 0.1 and 0.9 quantiles in the t-test).
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 all
Panel A: Autocorrelation 1st lag coef log price change (xit = yi,t−1)
Q1 −0.03
(0.000)
−0.03
(0.000)
−0.05
(0.000)
−0.08
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.00
(0.005)
−0.01
(0.003)
−0.01
(0.001)
−0.05
(0.000)
−0.00
(0.005)
0.00
(0.005)
−0.02
(0.026)
−0.03
(0.000)
Q2 −0.02
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.03
(0.000)
−0.07
(0.000)
−0.01
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.04
(0.000)
−0.00
(0.000)
−0.06
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.03
(0.000)
−0.03
(0.000)
Q3 −0.00
(0.000)
0.00
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.06
(0.000)
−0.01
(0.000)
−0.04
(0.000)
−0.06
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.06
(0.000)
−0.04
(0.000)
−0.03
(0.000)
−0.03
(0.001)
−0.03
(0.000)
Q4 −0.01
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.03
(0.000)
−0.05
(0.000)
−0.00
(0.000)
−0.03
(0.000)
−0.07
(0.000)
−0.04
(0.000)
−0.08
(0.000)
−0.06
(0.000)
−0.08
(0.000)
−0.04
(0.000)
−0.04
(0.000)
Q5 −0.05
(0.000)
−0.04
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
0.00
(0.000)
0.04
(0.000)
0.01
(0.000)
−0.03
(0.000)
0.00
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.01
(0.000)
−0.04
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
all −0.02
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.03
(0.000)
−0.05
(0.000)
−0.00
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.04
(0.000)
−0.01
(0.000)
−0.05
(0.000)
−0.03
(0.000)
−0.03
(0.000)
−0.03
(0.000)
−0.03
(0.000)
Panel B: Autocorrelation 2nd lag coef log price change (xit = yi,t−2)
Q1 −0.03
(0.001)
−0.05
(0.000)
−0.04
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.094)
−0.03
(0.135)
−0.02
(0.001)
−0.06
(0.000)
−0.05
(0.000)
−0.01
(0.026)
−0.01
(0.249)
−0.02
(0.015)
−0.01
(0.135)
−0.03
(0.000)
Q2 −0.03
(0.001)
−0.03
(0.003)
−0.03
(0.009)
−0.01
(0.320)
−0.03
(0.001)
−0.01
(0.249)
−0.04
(0.001)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.01
(0.015)
−0.02
(0.001)
−0.00
(0.009)
−0.02
(0.649)
−0.02
(0.000)
Q3 −0.02
(0.584)
−0.02
(0.070)
−0.02
(0.045)
−0.01
(0.664)
−0.01
(0.584)
−0.01
(0.029)
−0.04
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.017)
−0.00
(0.010)
−0.00
(0.029)
−0.01
(0.029)
−0.01
(0.001)
−0.02
(0.000)
Q4 −0.01
(0.001)
−0.02
(0.249)
−0.02
(0.041)
−0.03
(0.041)
−0.02
(0.320)
−0.00
(0.063)
−0.03
(0.009)
−0.02
(0.094)
0.00
(0.003)
−0.01
(0.003)
0.01
(0.003)
−0.00
(0.001)
−0.01
(0.000)
Q5 −0.01
(0.029)
−0.01
(0.000)
−0.01
(0.017)
−0.00
(0.017)
−0.00
(0.000)
0.00
(0.010)
−0.01
(0.500)
−0.00
(0.000)
−0.01
(0.017)
−0.01
(0.009)
0.00
(0.087)
0.00
(0.070)
−0.01
(0.000)
all −0.02
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.01
(0.010)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.01
(0.000)
−0.04
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.00
(0.000)
−0.01
(0.000)
−0.00
(0.000)
−0.01
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
Panel C: Standard deviation of idiosyncratic component specialist inventory Iit
Q1 691
(0.000)
968
(0.000)
813
(0.000)
964
(0.000)
1126
(0.000)
1336
(0.000)
1344
(0.000)
1489
(0.000)
1472
(0.000)
1122
(0.000)
1119
(0.000)
1128
(0.000)
1131
(0.000)
Q2 472
(0.000)
510
(0.000)
488
(0.000)
524
(0.000)
530
(0.000)
695
(0.000)
819
(0.000)
647
(0.000)
448
(0.000)
391
(0.000)
441
(0.000)
400
(0.000)
530
(0.000)
Q3 374
(0.000)
429
(0.000)
383
(0.000)
372
(0.000)
430
(0.000)
452
(0.000)
668
(0.000)
437
(0.000)
293
(0.000)
242
(0.000)
266
(0.000)
271
(0.000)
385
(0.000)
Q4 226
(0.000)
254
(0.000)
255
(0.000)
261
(0.000)
291
(0.000)
315
(0.000)
320
(0.000)
333
(0.000)
229
(0.000)
163
(0.000)
145
(0.000)
147
(0.000)
245
(0.000)
Q5 167
(0.000)
159
(0.000)
167
(0.000)
234
(0.000)
204
(0.000)
223
(0.000)
210
(0.000)
186
(0.000)
129
(0.000)
108
(0.000)
95
(0.000)
95
(0.000)
165
(0.000)
all 386
(0.000)
464
(0.000)
421
(0.000)
471
(0.000)
516
(0.000)
604
(0.000)
672
(0.000)
619
(0.000)
514
(0.000)
405
(0.000)
413
(0.000)
408
(0.000)
491
(0.000)
Panel D: AR coef estimates idiosyncratic component specialist inventory Iit (xit = yi,t−1)
Q1 0.28
(0.000)
0.27
(0.000)
0.26
(0.000)
0.22
(0.000)
0.25
(0.000)
0.27
(0.000)
0.28
(0.000)
0.29
(0.000)
0.28
(0.000)
0.34
(0.000)
0.37
(0.000)
0.25
(0.000)
0.28
(0.000)
Q2 0.47
(0.000)
0.46
(0.000)
0.44
(0.000)
0.38
(0.000)
0.35
(0.000)
0.34
(0.000)
0.36
(0.000)
0.32
(0.000)
0.25
(0.000)
0.28
(0.000)
0.33
(0.000)
0.25
(0.000)
0.35
(0.000)
Q3 0.59
(0.000)
0.59
(0.000)
0.56
(0.000)
0.51
(0.000)
0.49
(0.000)
0.45
(0.000)
0.41
(0.000)
0.41
(0.000)
0.30
(0.000)
0.31
(0.000)
0.34
(0.000)
0.24
(0.000)
0.43
(0.000)
Q4 0.74
(0.000)
0.73
(0.000)
0.71
(0.000)
0.66
(0.000)
0.63
(0.000)
0.63
(0.000)
0.59
(0.000)
0.57
(0.000)
0.40
(0.000)
0.38
(0.000)
0.36
(0.000)
0.29
(0.000)
0.56
(0.000)
Q5 0.82
(0.000)
0.80
(0.000)
0.80
(0.000)
0.77
(0.000)
0.78
(0.000)
0.79
(0.000)
0.77
(0.000)
0.76
(0.000)
0.66
(0.000)
0.61
(0.000)
0.57
(0.000)
0.51
(0.000)
0.72
(0.000)
all 0.58
(0.000)
0.57
(0.000)
0.56
(0.000)
0.51
(0.000)
0.50
(0.000)
0.50
(0.000)
0.48
(0.000)
0.47
(0.000)
0.38
(0.000)
0.38
(0.000)
0.39
(0.000)
0.31
(0.000)
0.47
(0.000)
<continued on next page>
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 all
Panel E: Regression coeﬃcient log price change on lagged idiosyncratic component specialist inventory Ii,t−1
Q1 0.01
(0.005)
0.01
(0.000)
0.01
(0.009)
0.01
(0.000)
0.01
(0.005)
0.01
(0.135)
0.01
(0.005)
0.01
(0.005)
0.01
(0.001)
0.00
(0.249)
0.00
(0.063)
0.00
(0.135)
0.01
(0.000)
Q2 0.01
(0.041)
0.01
(0.009)
0.01
(0.015)
0.02
(0.000)
0.01
(0.041)
0.02
(0.000)
0.02
(0.001)
0.02
(0.041)
0.02
(0.000)
0.02
(0.135)
0.01
(0.135)
0.01
(0.063)
0.02
(0.000)
Q3 0.02
(0.010)
0.02
(0.001)
0.02
(0.045)
0.02
(0.000)
0.02
(0.145)
0.03
(0.001)
0.05
(0.000)
0.01
(0.000)
0.05
(0.000)
0.03
(0.017)
0.03
(0.102)
0.03
(0.199)
0.03
(0.000)
Q4 0.03
(0.063)
0.02
(0.135)
0.04
(0.000)
0.05
(0.000)
0.04
(0.000)
0.06
(0.000)
0.08
(0.000)
0.05
(0.000)
0.11
(0.000)
0.05
(0.026)
0.08
(0.000)
0.06
(0.026)
0.06
(0.000)
Q5 0.08
(0.000)
0.08
(0.199)
0.03
(0.010)
0.02
(0.017)
0.06
(0.006)
0.06
(0.416)
0.14
(0.000)
0.10
(0.000)
0.15
(0.000)
0.08
(0.009)
0.12
(0.008)
0.13
(0.500)
0.09
(0.000)
all 0.03
(0.000)
0.03
(0.000)
0.02
(0.000)
0.02
(0.000)
0.03
(0.000)
0.03
(0.000)
0.06
(0.000)
0.04
(0.000)
0.07
(0.000)
0.04
(0.000)
0.05
(0.000)
0.05
(0.008)
0.04
(0.000)
*/**: Signiﬁcant at a 95%/99% level.
30Table 3: State space model estimates by year and size quintile
This table estimates the following state space model for a latent eﬃcient price and an observed end-of-day midquote
price:
(observed price) pit = mit + sit
(unobserved eﬃcient price) mit = mi,t−1 + βi ˆ ft + wit wit = κiˆ Iit + uit
(unobserved transitory price deviation) sit = αiIit + β0
i ˆ ft + ···+ β3
i ˆ ft−3 + εit
where i indexes over stocks and t indexes over days, mit is the end-of-day unobserved eﬃcient price (‘state’), ˆ ft is a
midquote return common factor which is the cross-sectional average of the standardized midquote return series which
has been ﬁltered with an AR(4) model to remove intertemporal dynamics, pit is end-of-day observed midquote, Iit is
the idiosyncratic part of the specialist end-of-day inventory in dollars that remains after removing a common factor
across specialist inventories, ˆ Iit is the idiosyncratic inventory innovation which is obtained as the residual of an AR(9)
model and captures the surprise part of the net imbalance, β
j
i captures potential ‘overreaction’ or lagged adjustment
to common factor innovations, and wit and εit are mutually independent i.i.d. error terms. The model is estimated
using maximum likelihood estimates where the error terms wit and εit are assumed to be normally distributed. The
optimization is implemented in ox with ssfpack routines where we use the Kalman ﬁlter to evaluate the likelihood
(see Koopman, Shephard, and Doornik (1999)). The table reports p-values in brackets. These p-values are based
on a test statistic that counts the number of signiﬁcant t-values across all stock-year estimates in the bin. The test
statistic is binomially distributed under the null (we use the 0.1 and 0.9 quantiles in the t-test).
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 all
Panel A: αi conditional price pressure
Q1 −0.03
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
−0.01
(0.000)
−0.01
(0.000)
−0.01
(0.000)
−0.02
(0.000)
Q2 −0.06
(0.000)
−0.05
(0.000)
−0.05
(0.000)
−0.04
(0.000)
−0.03
(0.000)
−0.05
(0.000)
−0.05
(0.000)
−0.05
(0.000)
−0.05
(0.000)
−0.03
(0.001)
−0.03
(0.000)
−0.03
(0.000)
−0.04
(0.000)
Q3 −0.11
(0.000)
−0.09
(0.000)
−0.09
(0.000)
−0.07
(0.000)
−0.09
(0.000)
−0.12
(0.000)
−0.11
(0.000)
−0.06
(0.000)
−0.09
(0.000)
−0.06
(0.000)
−0.07
(0.000)
−0.06
(0.000)
−0.09
(0.000)
Q4 −0.33
(0.000)
−0.25
(0.000)
−0.30
(0.000)
−0.27
(0.000)
−0.26
(0.000)
−0.34
(0.000)
−0.27
(0.000)
−0.23
(0.000)
−0.27
(0.000)
−0.14
(0.000)
−0.19
(0.000)
−0.16
(0.000)
−0.25
(0.000)
Q5 −1.07
(0.000)
−1.04
(0.000)
−0.78
(0.000)
−0.74
(0.000)
−1.01
(0.000)
−1.09
(0.000)
−1.19
(0.000)
−1.30
(0.000)
−1.20
(0.000)
−0.86
(0.000)
−0.94
(0.000)
−0.87
(0.000)
−1.01
(0.000)
all −0.32
(0.000)
−0.29
(0.000)
−0.25
(0.000)
−0.23
(0.000)
−0.28
(0.000)
−0.32
(0.000)
−0.33
(0.000)
−0.33
(0.000)
−0.32
(0.000)
−0.22
(0.000)
−0.25
(0.000)
−0.23
(0.000)
−0.28
(0.000)
Panel B: |αi|σ(I)i (explained) transitory volatility i.e. unconditional price pressure
Q1 14 13 13 16 19 22 25 30 22 15 14 9 17
Q2 26 24 22 19 20 33 36 30 23 14 15 13 23
Q3 39 40 35 31 40 48 45 35 23 16 20 17 32
Q4 65 64 69 58 63 86 77 63 41 21 24 21 54
Q5 116 109 115 107 152 177 184 155 108 92 71 54 120
a l l 5 25 05 14 65 87 37 36 24 33 12 92 34 9
Panel C: κi informativeness order imbalance innovation ˆ I
Q1 −0.08
(0.000)
−0.08
(0.000)
−0.08
(0.000)
−0.07
(0.000)
−0.08
(0.000)
−0.08
(0.000)
−0.09
(0.000)
−0.07
(0.000)
−0.07
(0.000)
−0.06
(0.000)
−0.06
(0.000)
−0.06
(0.000)
−0.07
(0.000)
Q2 −0.16
(0.000)
−0.13
(0.000)
−0.13
(0.000)
−0.14
(0.000)
−0.17
(0.000)
−0.15
(0.000)
−0.18
(0.000)
−0.15
(0.000)
−0.16
(0.000)
−0.15
(0.000)
−0.13
(0.000)
−0.13
(0.000)
−0.15
(0.000)
Q3 −0.22
(0.000)
−0.19
(0.000)
−0.18
(0.000)
−0.21
(0.000)
−0.25
(0.000)
−0.23
(0.000)
−0.26
(0.000)
−0.24
(0.000)
−0.26
(0.000)
−0.25
(0.000)
−0.26
(0.000)
−0.23
(0.000)
−0.23
(0.000)
Q4 −0.34
(0.000)
−0.28
(0.000)
−0.29
(0.000)
−0.37
(0.000)
−0.44
(0.000)
−0.36
(0.000)
−0.47
(0.000)
−0.43
(0.000)
−0.52
(0.000)
−0.56
(0.000)
−0.52
(0.000)
−0.50
(0.000)
−0.43
(0.000)
Q5 −0.59
(0.000)
−0.43
(0.000)
−0.61
(0.000)
−0.63
(0.000)
−0.72
(0.000)
−0.48
(0.000)
−0.73
(0.000)
−0.87
(0.000)
−1.25
(0.000)
−1.43
(0.000)
−1.29
(0.000)
−1.41
(0.000)
−0.87
(0.000)
all −0.28
(0.000)
−0.22
(0.000)
−0.26
(0.000)
−0.28
(0.000)
−0.34
(0.000)
−0.26
(0.000)
−0.35
(0.000)
−0.35
(0.000)
−0.46
(0.000)
−0.49
(0.000)
−0.45
(0.000)
−0.47
(0.000)
−0.35
(0.000)
Panel D: |κi|σ(ˆ I)i explained permanent volatility
Q1 39 36 38 44 57 65 80 56 55 37 30 27 47
Q2 42 39 41 45 65 70 85 61 56 44 36 36 52
Q3 44 42 43 54 72 70 86 75 60 48 41 36 56
Q4 47 40 42 52 73 64 83 75 66 60 49 43 58
Q5 43 39 49 56 69 56 78 90 80 75 65 63 64
a l l 4 33 94 35 06 76 58 37 26 35 34 44 15 5
<continued on next page>
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 all
Panel E: σ(w)i permanent volatility
Q1 124 124 128 134 176 198 243 192 187 126 106 103 153
Q2 143 136 138 144 186 213 257 212 206 151 127 125 170
Q3 151 143 147 158 204 213 253 212 205 153 138 136 176
Q4 162 152 153 158 201 211 239 212 199 163 145 151 179
Q5 176 170 181 181 228 232 264 245 244 202 178 190 208
all 151 145 149 155 199 213 251 215 208 159 139 141 177
Panel F:
α2
i σ2(I)i
σ2(w)i+β2
i σ2( ˆ f) ratio of transitory and permanent variance
Q1 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
Q2 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
Q3 0.28 0.27 0.16 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.12
Q4 0.30 0.47 0.47 0.28 0.23 0.47 0.22 0.16 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.23
Q5 1.11 1.42 1.14 1.16 1.24 2.55 1.96 1.09 0.79 2.10 0.61 0.62 1.32
all 0.36 0.45 0.36 0.31 0.32 0.65 0.46 0.28 0.18 0.44 0.15 0.16 0.34
Panel G:
α2
i σ2(I)i
σ2(w)i ratio of transitory and permanent ‘idiosyncratic’ variance
Q1 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03
Q2 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04
Q3 0.35 0.28 0.20 0.11 0.18 0.21 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.14
Q4 0.36 0.48 0.54 0.31 0.29 0.51 0.25 0.23 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.27
Q5 1.28 1.48 1.26 1.28 1.51 2.64 2.16 1.40 0.98 2.31 0.73 0.67 1.47
all 0.42 0.47 0.41 0.35 0.40 0.68 0.51 0.36 0.23 0.48 0.18 0.18 0.39
Panel H: σ(ε)i error term transitory volatility
Q1 20
(0.000)
17
(0.000)
25
(0.000)
30
(0.000)
24
(0.000)
20
(0.000)
31
(0.000)
22
(0.000)
31
(0.000)
18
(0.000)
12
(0.000)
15
(0.000)
22
(0.000)
Q2 19
(0.000)
19
(0.000)
21
(0.000)
28
(0.000)
24
(0.000)
22
(0.000)
43
(0.000)
21
(0.000)
39
(0.000)
23
(0.000)
17
(0.000)
19
(0.000)
25
(0.000)
Q3 19
(0.000)
17
(0.000)
22
(0.000)
23
(0.000)
27
(0.000)
30
(0.000)
45
(0.000)
27
(0.000)
41
(0.000)
25
(0.000)
20
(0.000)
20
(0.000)
26
(0.000)
Q4 28
(0.000)
25
(0.000)
23
(0.000)
26
(0.000)
18
(0.000)
23
(0.000)
42
(0.000)
30
(0.000)
43
(0.000)
30
(0.000)
30
(0.000)
24
(0.000)
29
(0.000)
Q5 42
(0.000)
42
(0.000)
34
(0.000)
25
(0.000)
21
(0.000)
29
(0.000)
47
(0.000)
38
(0.000)
39
(0.000)
28
(0.000)
28
(0.000)
25
(0.000)
33
(0.000)
all 26
(0.000)
24
(0.000)
25
(0.000)
27
(0.000)
23
(0.000)
25
(0.000)
42
(0.000)
28
(0.000)
39
(0.000)
25
(0.000)
21
(0.000)
21
(0.000)
27
(0.000)
32Table 4: Model’s primitive parameters and an analysis of the spread
This table analyzes the cost to liquidity demanders of a competitive intermediary who uses price pressure to control
her inventory position. The model’s primitive parameters consist of the liquidity demander’s total private value
rate λ and its dispersion
1
θ, uncertainty about net liquidity demand σ(ε), a discount factor β, and the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion (γ) which is the model’s absolute risk aversion (˜ γ) divided by the intermediary’s expected
consumption at the competitive spread. The conditional price pressure estimates along with other trading variables
measured in the empirical part of the paper (sample averages in Panel A cf. Table 1 and 3) allows for identiﬁcation
of the primitive parameters (Panel B) which in turn allow for a decomposition of the net cost to liquidity demanders
(investors) of liquidity supply by a competitive intermediary (Panel C). It expresses this net cost as a fraction of
transacted volume (‘spread’) and decomposes it into a spread received by the intermediary and a subsidy enjoyed
by the liquidity demanders at times when prices are pressured. It also calculates the Pareto eﬃcient cost if the
intermediary were to internalize the subsidy enjoyed by the liquidity demander. Panel B and C report medians and
interquartile ranges (Q0.75-Q0.25 where Qi is quantile i) in parentheses.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 all
Panel A: Measured variables that identify model’s primitive parameters (cf. Table 1 and 3)
conditional price pressure αi (bps per $1000) -0.02 -0.04 -0.09 -0.25 -1.01 -0.28
stdev daily inventory σ(I) ($1000) 1131 530 385 245 165 491
1st order autocorrelation inventory 0.28 0.35 0.43 0.56 0.72 0.47
price risk inventory σ(w)i (bps) 153 170 176 179 208 177
daily dollar volume
a ($million) 10.86 2.98 1.43 0.60 0.21 3.22
eﬀective half spread 8.41 12.46 16.50 24.60 46.12 21.62
daily discount factor
b 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998
Panel B: Identiﬁcation of model’s primitive parameters
daily private value rate λ ($1000) 59.69
(241.59)
14.12
(37.71)
6.21
(13.39)
2.77
(4.63)
1.46
(2.31)
5.86
(21.73)
dispersion private value
1
θ (bps) 171
(312)
135
(201)
148
(166)
187
(206)
307
(370)
186
(260)
intermediary’s relative risk aversion γ 0.24
(1.06)
0.15
(0.55)
0.11
(0.35)
0.09
(0.26)
0.05
(0.13)
0.10
(0.35)
Panel C: Decomposition of the spread paid by liquidity demander
(1) model-implied competitive spread (bps) 7.32
(15.81)
12.86
(25.31)
19.43
(40.04)
37.35
(68.62)
73.16
(149.27)
22.60
(57.68)
(2) price pressure subsidy to liq demander (bps) 0.58
(1.21)
1.40
(3.13)
2.63
(5.64)
6.00
(13.49)
15.52
(33.26)
2.88
(9.56)
(3) net spread to liq demander
c (1)-(2) (bps) 6.50
(14.14)
11.01
(22.33)
16.52
(33.16)
30.33
(55.40)
57.41
(114.93)
19.14
(47.18)
(4) constrained Pareto eﬃcient spread (bps) 6.45
(14.07)
10.74
(21.59)
16.05
(31.87)
29.54
(53.53)
54.77
(110.32)
18.67
(45.48)
(5) deadweight loss
c (3)-(4) (bps) 0.05
(0.11)
0.14
(0.38)
0.30
(0.80)
0.88
(2.18)
2.58
(5.68)
0.35
(1.51)
a: dollar volumeit ∗ specialist participit as a proxy for volume intermediated by the specialist
b: discount factor equals the reciprocal of the gross riskfree rate from Kenneth French’ website
c: the reported diﬀerence is the median of diﬀerences, not the diﬀerence of (reported) medians
33Figure 1: Price change decomposition given state space model estimates not using
inventory data
This ﬁgure depicts the observed end-of-day log price series (midquote price) and its unobserved eﬃcient price (given
all data using the Kalman smoother) estimate not using inventory data for a representative stock (Rex Stores
Corporation, ticker RSC, CRSP PERMNO 68830). The model is deﬁned as:
(observed price) pit = mit + sit
(unobserved eﬃcient price) mit = mi,t−1 + βi ˆ ft + wit
(unobserved transitory price deviation) sit = ϕisi,t−1 + β0
i ˆ ft + ···+ β3
i ˆ ft−3 + εit
where i indexes over stocks and t indexes over days, mit is the end-of-day unobserved eﬃcient price (‘state’), ˆ ft is the
midquote return common factor which is the cross-sectional average of the standardized midquote return series which
has been ﬁltered with an AR(4) model to remove intertemporal dynamics, pit is the end-of-day observed midquote
price, β
j
i captures potential ‘overreaction’ or lagged adjustment to common factor innovations, and wit and εit are
mutually independent i.i.d. error terms. The model is estimated using maximum likelihood estimates where the error
terms wit and εit are assumed to be normally distributed. The ﬁrst panel graphs these series recentered around the
ﬁrst day’s estimate of the eﬃcient price. The second panel graphs the price pressure—the diﬀerence between the
observed price and the eﬃcient price—against the idiosyncratic inventory position of the specialist. The third graphs
the eﬃcient price innovation against the contemporaneous unpredictable ‘surprise’ idiosyncratic inventory change
which is obtained as the residual of an AR(9) model.
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